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An uneasy AllianCe!
The United States has approximately 82,000
automated teller machines (ATMs) which process
over400 million banking transactions per
month. About 85 percent of these transactions
occur on ATMs that are part of a "shared ATM
network." Banks and other depository institutions
form these networks to share ATMs with one
another and with institutions that do not
own ATMs.
Shared ATM networks benefit banks and ATM
users alike. Sharing lowers the unit costs of
operating an ATM network by increasing the
number of transactions conducted at each ATM
within the network. Sharing also expands the
geographic area within which customers can
obtain transaction services. In addition, it
enables small banks to provide some "big
bank" services.
To achieve these benefits, shared networks
require some degree of cooperation among par-
ticipating financial institutions. Such cooperative
agreements can be complex and unstable. This
Letter discusses the characteristics of these coop-
erative agreements and their implications for the
welfare of consumers in connection with a recent
complaint that has been brought against a shared
ATM network.
The costs of shared networks
The fixed costs associated with owning and
operating a large network of ATMs are consider-
able. By s-preaai riglnese fixed costs over-a large
volume of transactions, a bank can lower the unit
cost of operating a network. However, only very
large banks generate sufficient transaction
volume to profit from a proprietary network of
geographically dispersed ATMs. In most cases,
moreover, even large banks find off-premise
ATMs (those that are not located at a bank
branch) unprofitable, since these off-premise
machines do not generate sufficient transaction
volume to justify the added expenses.
Shared networks, in contrast, enable banks to
spread the fixed costs of an ATM network over a
larger volume of transactions, therRby lowering
the unit cost of transactions. Likewise, shared
networks can make off-premise ATMs profitable.
As a result, even many of the nation's largest
banks have joined shared systems in recent
years. Under sharing arrangements, then, each
bank continues to own and operate its ATMs, but
agrees to allow other banks' customers to use its
machines.
Just as ATMs themselves are subject to falling
unit costs, so is the sharing technology. The
main element in the sharing technology is the
"switch;' which facilitates the transfer of trans-
actions between shared network members. Trans-
actions carried out by one bank's customer on
another bank's ATM, referred to as "foreign trans-
actions," are routed from the ATM, through the
switch, and on to the data processor of the
customer's bank. The switch has a large fixed
cost, so switch costs per transaction fall as the
number of foreign transactions increases, up to
a large number of foreign transactions.
The existence of falling unit costs in the switch
means that every member of a shared network
benefits from an increase in foreign transactions
originated at any member's ATM, and suffers
from a decrease in foreign transactions. The
shared network's costs per switched transaction,
which have to be met by member "switch" fees,
-tnl.Jssnould varyinverseTy-wlth-tnenumberof
foreign transactions.
Cooperation in shared networks
To achieve the benefits of sharing, all shared
networks require cooperation among banks that
are otherwise competitors. For instance, member
banks must agree on certain technological spec-
ifications for their ATMs to permit the transmis-
sion and processing of foreign transactions. In
addition, members may be required to meetFRBSF
certain security standards or advertising practices
to protect the public image of the network as a
whole.
In most shared networks, cooperation is for-
malized through the organization of the network
as a joint venture. In these networks, equity
ownership and control of the decision-making
processes regarding membership access, organi-
zational structure, and specific details of network
operation are shared between some or all of the
members.
Cooperation in shared networks often extends to
agreements on certain types of fees and prices.
In addition to setting the switch fee and other
network fees, shared networks set the "inter-
change" fee which members pay to each other
(as opposed to the network owners) to cover the
costs of foreign transactions. The interchange fee
is paid by the customer's bank to the ATM-
owning bank and is the same for all members.
In turn, the bank that is charged the interchange
fee often will pass this fee on to the customer
who initiated the foreign transaction.
Shared networks set fixed interchange fees to
avoid each individual member negotiating with
each individual ATM-owner. The large number
of bilateral negotiations necessary in such a sit-
uation likely would be prohibitively expensive
to define and implement. Moreover, if some pairs
of members could not reach agreement, the
shared network could no longer offer universal
access to all customers of all members.
Afatal flaw?
Cooperative agreements between competing
firms presumably increase the profits of the firms
that are a party to the agreement. However, such
arrangements often generate conflicting interests
..whiG:l+-t!+rgater:l-theexistence-of the agreement
since they create an opportunity for individual
members of the group to increase profits even
more by violating the agreement that all other
members are honoring. Ultimately, of course, the
agreement will disintegrate if each member sepa-
rately ignores it, thinking that all other members
will hold to it. If this happens, all the members
will be worse off than if they all had honored
the agreement.
Shared networks have not been able to
completely avoid the internal conflicts that are
inherent in cooperative agreements. In 1987, a
member of a regional network raised objections
to thejoint fixing of interchange fees in shared
networks. More recently, a member of a large
national shared network has challenged the net-
work's prohibition of "surcharges:'fees that ATM
owners charge directly to customers of other
banks for foreign transactions. These fees are in
addition to any interchange fees the non-ATM
owning bank may pass on to its customer.
The shared network is being sued by the network
member on the grounds that it fixes prices in
violation of antitrust laws. The bank claims that
the interchange fee is not sufficient to compen-
sate it for the full value of the foreign transactions
carried out at its own heavily-trafficked off-prem-
ise ATMs. Despite the objections of the network,
this bank has started to charge customers of
other network members a $1.00 surcharge every
time they use one of the bank's ATMs in airports,
casinos or hotels.
This type of infringement is typical of breaches
of cooperative agreements. The recalcitrant
member benefits only if the other members of the
group continue to honor the agreement. A lone
bank that imposes a surcharge will benefit when
the surcharge raises revenues more than it raises
costs. Although the number of transactions
routed through the switch would fall, it would
not fall by an amount sufficient to significantly
raise per transaction member fees. However, if
all members were to impose a surcharge, the
decrease in foreign transactions could be sub-
stantial, and per transaction member fees then
would rise significantly. This is why virtually all
shared networks prohibit surcharges.
Bad news for ATM users?
Thus, the widespread imposition of surcharges
·cGuIGl-Rave-anaQverseimpact-oRcoR5umers.TRe- .-
introduction of surcharges would raise the price
of foreign transactions both directly, through the
surcharge, and indirectly, through the rise in the
per unit network cost of foreign transactions.
If the costs of sharing rise too much, the shared
network could break up, increasing the costs of
all ATM transactions, not just foreign transac-
tions. Moreover, surcharges could lead to the
break-up of shared ATM networks because banks
might be reluctant to remain in sharing arrange-
ments in which they have no control over theprice that their customers pay to use other banks'
ATMs. It is possible that banks could regain con-
trol by negotiating with ATM owners and setting
up contracts on a case-by-case basis, but this
may be prohibitively expensive.
On the other hand, permitting ATM-owning
banks to levy surcharges may have some benefi-
cial effects, as well. It is possible, as advocates
of surcharges argue, that the number of ,A,Tfv1s
installed would increase. Under current shared
network practices, the interchange fee is the only
compensation that an ATM owner receives for
the costs of a foreign transaction. Thus, the sup-
ply of ATMs is restricted by the fixed interchange
fee. If ATM owners in shared networks were per-
mitted to impose a surcharge and thus were able
to capture the full value of ATMs installed at
popular locations, it is likely that more ATMs
would be installed at such locations.
Surcharges unlikely
Even if the courts rule that shared ATM networks
must allow surcharges, there is reason to believe
that surcharges will not become widespread or
be very large. i\n increase in the price of foreign
ATM transactions due to a surcharge would
decrease the number of these transactions. If
demand for foreign transactions were quite sen-
sitive to changes in price, revenues to the ATM
owner imposing the surcharge could fall. More-
over, a substantial decrease in demand at one
bank's ATMs might not affect network costs very
much, but would increase that bank's own per
unit costs that are not shared with other network
members. Therefore, demand that is quite sensi-
tive to price changes would help to minimize
surcharges.
Only in cases where demand is relatively in-
sensitive to price changes would ATM owners
possibly benefit from surcharges. For example,
the number of transactions conducted atan ATt"v1
in a casino is not likely to be too sensitive to an
increase in the price if the location cannot sup-
port an additional, competing ATM. Only banks
with ATMs at such exclusive locations would be
able to profit from surcharges. The number of
such exclusive locations likely is small, given
the ubiquity of off-premise ATMs owned by dif-
ferent banks. This suggests that most banks do
not have an incentive to impose surcharges,
which means, in turn, that ATM networks are
inherently stable.
Prohibitions on surcharges probably were
needed when shared networks were getting
established and there were fewer off-premise
/\TMs, and hence more market power associated
with each one. Now that off-premise ATMs are
more commonplace, competition likely could
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